Opinion | Does NRM Secretariat Truly Work For President Museveni?

By Brian Keitira

As the clock races toward the next election, with barely 41 days remaining, a difficult truth must be confronted. If the National Resistance Movement does not immediately rethink its approach, it risks surrendering the hard-to-reach areas once again. These communities may be distant on the map, but politically they are central to Uganda’s electoral landscape. Yet the NRM Secretariat continues to operate on a “one size fits all” model, allocating identical mobilisation funds to remote island districts and easy-to-access mainland areas. This is not strategy. It is negligence.

A critical question now hangs in the air. Does the Secretariat genuinely consult anyone before drafting mobilisation plans? Is there credible research into the realities of island and fishing communities? Do their voices ever reach the decision-makers? In places such as Buvuma and Kalangala, which represent a broader national trend, mobilisation is costly, transport is unpredictable, and community concerns are distinct. Nevertheless, the Secretariat treats mobilisation there as if it is no more complex than driving to a mainland trading centre. As the old saying goes, you cannot milk a cow that you have not fed. How then does the Secretariat expect meaningful results where it has invested neither effort nor understanding?

The 2021 results should have sounded the loudest alarm. In Kalangala, President Museveni received 28.15 percent while Kyagulanyi secured 70.01 percent. In Buvuma, the President registered 32.36 percent against Kyagulanyi’s 64.45 percent. These outcomes were not flukes. They reflected deeper political shifts that required urgent attention. Instead, the same errors are resurfacing. Communities have real and legitimate concerns, yet the Secretariat’s posture remains unchanged. Its focus appears fixed on high-profile rallies rather than building relationships that matter. Entire delegations may sweep through these regions, and while some residents may cheer them on, the ballot often tells a very different story. Rallies create spectacle, but spectacle does not translate into votes.

The public is therefore right to ask who is failing the President. Is it the Secretary General, the Director of Mobilisation, the Central Executive Committee that accompanies him, or the technical teams at the Secretariat? Someone is clearly falling short. Someone is placing the President’s legacy in jeopardy. Hard-to-reach areas are not political afterthoughts. They are home to vital economic sectors including fisheries, tourism assets, oil-palm projects, and entire livelihoods that support the national economy. To neglect them is to set a house on fire while the family is preparing a meal. Ultimately, everyone loses.

When election results are disappointing, blame is often directed at district leaders or voters. Yet the root of the failure often lies much higher. If these communities again drift toward the opposition, it will not be because they reject the NRM. It will be because the mobilisation structures failed to appear, failed to listen, and failed to adapt. No national leader should be exposed to ridicule simply because those tasked with supporting him chose convenience over competence.

The remaining 41 days call for urgency and clear-headed action. The Secretariat must change course and adopt a realistic, research-driven, community-centered approach. It must consult meaningfully, allocate resources based on actual terrain and cost, and engage citizens in ways that build trust rather than perform for cameras. Real politics is not conducted on stages. It is nurtured in villages, islands, landing sites, and the quiet conversations that shape perception and loyalty.

Time is almost up. The NRM Secretariat must wake up now or be forced to confront election results that it will not be able to justify.

The writer is a senior NRM cadre from the Ssese Islands.